Unlike safety properties which require the absence of a "bad" program trace, k-safety properties stipulate the absence of a "bad" interaction between k traces. Examples of k-safety properties include transitivity, associativity, anti-symmetry, and monotonicity. This paper presents a sound and relatively complete calculus, called Cartesian Hoare Logic (CHL), for verifying k-safety properties. Our program logic is designed with automation and scalability in mind, allowing us to formulate a verification algorithm that automates reasoning in CHL. We have implemented our verification algorithm in a fully automated tool called DESCARTES, which can be used to analyze any k-safety property of Java programs. We have used DESCARTES to analyze user-defined relational operators and demonstrate that DESCARTES is effective at verifying (or finding violations of) multiple k-safety properties.
Introduction
Following the success of Hoare logic as a formal system to verify program correctness, many tools can prove safety properties expressed as pre-and post-conditions. That is, given a Hoare triple {Φ} S {Ψ}, program verifiers establish that terminating executions of S on inputs satisfying Φ * This work was supported in part by NSF Award #1453386 and AFRL Awards # 8750-14-2-0270 and 8750-15-2-0096.
produce outputs consistent with Ψ. Hence, a valid Hoare triple states which input-output pairs are feasible in a single, but arbitrary, execution of S.
However, some important functional correctness properties require reasoning about the relationship between multiple program executions. As a simple example, consider determinism, which requires ∀x, y. x = y ⇒ f (x) = f (y). This property is not a standard safety property because it cannot be violated by any individual execution trace. Instead, determinism is a so-called 2-safety hyperproperty [10] since we need two execution traces to establish its violation. In general, a k-safety (hyper-)property requires reasoning about relationships between k different execution traces.
Even though there has been some work on verifying 2-safety properties in the context of secure information flow [1, 3, 23] and security protocols of probabilistic systems [2, 4] , we are not aware of any general-purpose program logics that allow verifying k-safety properties for arbitrary values of k. Furthermore, even for k = 2, existing tools do not support a high degree of automation.
This paper argues that many important functional correctness properties are k-safety properties for k ≥ 2, and we present Cartesian Hoare Logic (CHL) for verifying general k-safety specifications. 1 Our new program logic for k-safety is sound, relatively complete, and has been designed to be easy to automate: We have built a verification tool called DESCARTES that fully automates reasoning in CHL and successfully used it to analyze k-safety requirements of userdefined relational operators in Java programs.
Motivating Example. To motivate the need for verifying k-safety properties, consider the widely used Comparator interface in Java. By implementing the compare method of this interface, programmers can define an ordering between objects of a given type. Unfortunately, writing a correct compare method is notoriously hard, as any valid comparator must satisfy three different k-safety properties:
• P1: ∀x, y. sgn(compare(x, y)) = −sgn(compare(y, x))
• P2: ∀x, y, z. (compare(x, y) > 0 ∧ compare(y, z) > 0) ⇒ compare(x, z) > 0 1 We call our calculus Cartesian Hoare Logic because it allows reasoning about the cartesian product of sets of input-output pairs from different runs.
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• P3: ∀x, y, z. (compare(x, y) = 0 ⇒ (sgn(compare(x, z)) = sgn(compare(y, z))))
Among these properties, P1 is a 2-safety property, while P2 and P3 are 3-safety properties. For instance, property P2 corresponds to transitivity, which can only be violated by a collection of three different runs of compare: Specifically, two runs where compare(a,b) and compare(b,c) both return positive values, and a third run compare(a,c) that returns zero or a negative value.
To demonstrate that implementing comparators can be hard, consider the compare method shown in Figure 1 , which is taken verbatim from a Stackoverflow post. This method is used for sorting poker hands according to their strength and represents hands as strings of 13 characters. In particular, the occurrence of number n at position k of the string indicates that the hand contains n cards of type k. Unfortunately, this method has a logical error when one of the hands is a full house and the other one has 3 cards of a kind; it therefore ends up violating properties P2 and P3. As a result, programs using this comparator either suffer from run-time exceptions or lose elements inserted into collections.
Cartesian Hoare Logic. As illustrated by this example, analyzing k-safety properties is extremely relevant for ensuring software correctness; yet there are no general purpose automated tools for analyzing k-safety properties. This paper aims to rectify this situation by proposing a general framework for specifying and verifying general k-safety properties.
In our approach, k-safety properties are specified using Cartesian Hoare triples of the form Φ S Ψ , where Φ and Ψ are first-order formulas that relate k different program runs. For instance, we can express property P2 from above using the following Cartesian Hoare triple:
Here, a variable named v i refers to the value of program variable v in the i'th program execution. Hence, the precondition Φ states that we are only interested in triples of executions (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ) where (i) the value of y in π 1 is equal to the value of x in π 2 , (ii) the values of x in π 1 and π 3 are the same, and (iii) the values of y are the same in π 2 and π 3 . The postcondition Ψ says that, if compare returns a positive value in both π 1 and π 2 , then it should also be positive in π 3 .
To verify such Cartesian Hoare triples, our new program logic reasons about the Cartesian product of sets of inputoutput pairs from k program runs. Specifically, if Σ represents the set of all input-output pairs of code S, then the judgment Φ S Ψ is derivable in our calculus iff every k-tuple in Σ k that satisfies Φ also satisfies Ψ. The key idea underlying our approach is to reduce the verification of a Cartesian Hoare triple to a standard Hoare triple that can be easily verified. Specifically, our calculus derives judgments of the form Φ (S 1 . . . S k ) Ψ where S 1 . . . S k represents a set of programs that simultaneously execute S 1 , . . . , S k . While every pair of programs P, P ∈ (S 1 . . . S k ) are semantically equivalent, our calculus exploits the fact that some of these programs are much easier to verify than others. Furthermore, and perhaps more crucially, our approach does not explicitly construct the set of programs in (S 1 . . . S k ) but reasons directly about the provability of Ψ on tuples of runs that satisfy Φ.
Contributions. To summarize, this paper makes the following key contributions:
• We argue that many natural functional correctness properties are k-safety properties, and we propose Cartesian Hoare triples for specifying them (Section 3).
• We present a sound and complete proof system called Cartesian Hoare Logic (CHL) for proving valid Cartesian Hoare triples (Section 4).
• We describe a practical algorithm based on CHL for automatically proving k-safety properties (Section 5).
• We use our techniques to analyze user-defined relational operators in Java and show that our tool can successfully verify (or find bugs in) such methods (Section 7).
Language and Preliminaries
Figure 2 presents a simple imperative language that we use for formalizing Cartesian Hoare Logic. In this language, atomic statements A include skip (denoted as ), assignments (x := e), array writes x[e] := e, and assume statements written as √ c. Statements also include composition S; S and conditionals S 1 ⊕ c S 2 , which execute S 1 if c evaluates to true and S 2 otherwise. In our language, loops have the syntax
* which is short-hand for the more convential loop construct:
In this paper, we choose to formalize loops with breaks rather than the simpler loop construct while(c) do S (i.e., [(c, S, )] * ) because break statements are ubiquitous in real programs and present a challenge for verifying k-safety.
We assume an operational semantics that is specified using judgments of the form σ, e ⇓ int and σ, S ⇓ σ , where e is a program expression, S is a statement, and σ, σ are valuations (stores) mapping program variables to their values. Since the operational semantics of this language is standard, we refer the interested reader to the extended version of the paper. Definition 1. (Entailment) Let σ be a valuation and ϕ a formula. We write σ |= ϕ iff σ, ϕ ⇓ true.
.indexOf('4') -c2.indexOf('4'); } int tripleCount1 = StringFunctions.countOccurrencesOf(c1, "3"); int tripleCount2 = StringFunctions.countOccurrencesOf(c2, "3"); if (tripleCount1 > 1 || (tripleCount1 == 1 && c1.indexOf('2') != -1) || tripleCount2 > 1 || (tripleCount2 == 1 && c2.indexOf('2') != -1)) { // Full house int higherTriple = c1.lastIndexOf('3'); if (higherTriple == c2.lastIndexOf('3')) { for (int i = 12; i >= 0
.charAt(i) == '3') return -1; } } return higherTriple -c2.lastIndexOf('3'); } return 0; } Figure 1 . A (buggy) comparator for sorting poker hands 
Validity of Cartesian Hoare Triples
We now introduce Cartesian Hoare triples and provide use cases from real-world programming idioms to motivate the relevance and general applicability of k-safety properties. σ 1 
we also have:
Intuitively, the validity of Φ S Ψ means that, if we run S on k inputs whose relationship is given by Φ, then the resulting outputs must respect Ψ. Hence, unlike a standard Hoare triple for which a counterexample consists of a single execution, a counterexample for a Cartesian Hoare triple includes k different executions. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the value k as the arity of the Cartesian Hoare triple.
Example 1. Figure 3 shows some familiar properties and their corresponding specification. Among these Cartesian Hoare triples, transitivity and homomorphism correspond to 3-safety properties, and associativity is a 4-safety property. The remaining Cartesian Hoare triples, such as monotocity, injectivity, and idempotence, have arity 2.
Example 2. Figure 4 shows some Cartesian Hoare triples and indicates whether they are valid. For instance, consider the first two rows of Figure 4 . For both examples, the precondition tells us to consider a pair of executions π 1 , π 2 where the values of x and y are swapped (i.e., the value of x in π 1 is the value of y in π 2 and vice versa). Since the statement of interest is z := x − y, the value of z in π 1 will be the additive inverse of the value of z in π 2 . Hence, the second Cartesian Hoare triple is valid, but the first one is not.
Realistic Use Cases for Cartesian Hoare Triples
We now highlight some scenarios where k-safety properties are relevant in modern programming. Since it is well-known that security properties such as non-interference are 2-safety properties [3, 23] , we do not include them in this discussion. Equality. A ubiquitious programming practice is to implement a custom equality operator for a given type, for example, by overriding the equals method in Java. A key property of equals is that it must be an equivalence relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). While reflexivity can be expressed as a standard Hoare triple, symmetry and transitivity are 2 and 3-safety properties respectively. Furthermore, equals must satisfy another 2-safety property called consistency, which requires multiple invocations of x.equals(y) to consistently return true or false. Comparators. Another common programming pattern involves writing a custom ordering operator, for example by implementing the Comparator interface in Java or operator<= in C++. Such comparators are required to define a total order -i.e., they must be reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive, and total. Programming errors in comparators are quite common and can have a variety of serious consequences.
For instance, such bugs can cause collections to unexpectedly lose elements or not be properly sorted. Map/Reduce. Map-reduce is a widely-used paradigm for writing parallel code [13, 24] . Here, the user-defined reduce function must be associative and stateless. Furthermore, if reduce is commutative and associative, then it can be used as a combiner, a "mini-reducer" that can be executed between the map and reduce phases to optimize bandwidth. In concurrent data structures that support reduce operations (e.g., the Java ConcurrentHashMap), the user-defined function must also be commutative and associative.
Cartesian Hoare Logic
We now present our program logic (CHL) for verifying Cartesian Hoare triples. The key idea underlying CHL is to verify Φ S Ψ by proving judgements of the form Φ (S 1 . . . S k ) Ψ where each S i corresponds to a different execution of S. Here, the notation S 1 . . . S k represents the set of all programs that are semantically equivalent to simultaneously running S 1 , . . . , S k . However, rather than explicitly constructing this set -or even any program in this set-we only reason about the provability of Ψ on sets of runs that jointly satisfy Φ. Hence, unlike previous approaches for proving equivalence or non-interference [3, 5, 26] , our technique does not construct a product program that is subsequently fed to an off-the-shelf verifier. Instead, we combine the verification task with the construction of only the relevant parts of the product program.
To motivate the advantages of our approach over explicit product construction, consider the following specification:
where S 1 and S 2 are very large code fragments. Now, let S ij represent S j [ x i / x] , and let S ij,kl be a program that executes S ij and S kl in lockstep. One way to verify our Cartesian Hoare triple is to construct the following product program and feed it to an off-the-shelf verifier:
However, this strategy is quite suboptimal: Since the precondition is x 1 > 0 ∧ x 2 ≤ 0, we are only interested in a small subset of P , which only includes S 11,22 . In contrast, by combining semantic reasoning with construction of the relevant Hoare triples, our approach can avoid constructing and reasoning about redundant parts of the product program.
Core Cartesian Hoare Logic
With this intuition in mind, we now explain the core subset of Cartesian Hoare Logic shown in Figure 5 . Since our calculus derives judgments of the form Φ S 1 . . . S n Ψ , we first start by defining the product space of two programs S 1 and S 2 , which we denote as S 1 S 2 :
Definition 5. (Product space) Let S 1 and S 2 be two statements such that vars(S 1 ) ∩ vars(S 2 ) = ∅. Then,
Intuitively, S 1 S 2 represents the set of programs that are semantically equivalent to the simultaneous execution of S 1 and S 2 . We generalize this notion of product space to arbitrary values of k and consider product terms χ of the form S 1 . . . S k where:
Since we want to reason about different runs of the same program, we also define the self-product space as follows:
In other words, S n represents the product space of n different α-renamed copies of S.
At a high level, the calculus rules shown in Figure 5 derive judgments of the form Φ χ Ψ indicating the provability of the standard Hoare triple {Φ} P {Ψ} for some program P ∈ χ . Since all programs in χ are semantically equivalent, this means that the Hoare triple {Φ} P {Ψ} is valid for any P ∈ χ . However, since some programs are easier to verify than other semantically equivalent variants, our calculus enables the verification of a Cartesian Hoare triple Φ S Ψ by considering different variants in the self-product space S n . We now explain the CHL rules in more detail and highlight how these proof rules allow us to achieve a good combination of flexibility, automatability, and scalability.
Expand. The first rule of Figure 5 reduces the verification of an n-ary Cartesian Hoare triple Φ S Ψ to the provability of Φ S n Ψ . Since each program P ∈ S n is semantically equivalent to the sequential execution of n α-renamed copies of S, the derivability of Φ S n Ψ implies the validity of Φ S Ψ .
Lift. The Lift rule allows us to prove Φ S n Ψ in the degenerate case where n = 1. In this case, we resort to standard Hoare logic to prove the validity of {Φ} S {Ψ}.
Skip intro. The next two rules, labeled -intro, allow us to introduce no-ops after statements and at the end of other product terms. These rules are useful for eliminating redundancy in our calculus.
Skip elim. The -elim rule, which is the analog of the -intro 2 rule, eliminates skip statements from product terms. Note that the elimination analog of the -intro 1 rule is unnecessary because it is derivable using the other rules.
Associativity. The Assoc rule exploits the associativity of operator : To prove Φ (χ 1 χ 2 ) χ 3 Ψ , it suffices to show Φ χ 1 (χ 2 χ 3 ) Ψ . The associativity rule is very important for the flexibility of our calculus because, together with the commutativity rule, it allows us to consider different interleavings between k program executions. Commutativity. The Comm rule states the commutativity of . Specifically, it says that a proof of Φ χ 1 χ 2 Ψ also constitutes a proof of Φ χ 2 χ 1 Ψ .
Step. The Step rule allows us to decompose the verification of Φ S 1 ; S 2 χ Ψ in the following way: First, we find an auxiliary assertion Φ and prove the validity of {Φ} S 1 {Φ }. If we can also establish the validity of Φ S 2 χ Ψ , we obtain a proof of Φ S 1 ; S 2 χ Ψ . This rule turns out to be particularly useful when we can execute S 2 and χ in lockstep, but not S 1 and χ.
Havoc. This rule allows us to prove Φ χ ∃V.Φ for any χ, where V denotes free variables in χ. Note that by, existentially quantifying V , we effectively assume that χ invalidates all facts we know about variables V . However, facts involving variables that are not modified by χ are still valid. The main purpose of the Havoc rule is to prune irrelevant parts of the state space by combining it with the Consq rule.
Consequence. The Consq rule is the direct analog of the standard consequence rule in Hoare logic. As expected, this rule states that we can prove the validity of Φ χ Ψ by proving Φ χ Ψ where Φ ⇒ Φ and Ψ ⇒ Ψ.
Example 3. We now illustrate why the Havoc and Consq rules are very useful. Suppose we would like to prove:
where S 2 , S 3 are statements over x 2 , x 3 . After using
Step to prove {true} x 1 := false {¬x 1 }, we end up with proof obligation ¬x 1 S 2 S 3 x 1 ∧ x 2 ⇒ x 3 . Since S 2 , S 3 do not contain variable x 1 , we can use Havoc to obtain a proof of ¬x 1 S 2 S 3 ¬x 1 . Now, since we have ¬x 1 ⇒ (x 1 ∧ x 2 ⇒ x 3 ), the consequence rule allows us to obtain the desired proof. Observe that, even though S 2 and S 3 are potentially very large program fragments, we were able to complete the proof without reasoning about S 2 S 3 at all.
Sequence. The Seq rule allows us to execute statements from different runs in lockstep. In particular, it tells us that we can prove Φ (
. . . S n Φ and then separately constructing a proof of Φ R 1 . . . R n χ Ψ .
If. The If rule allows us to "embed" product term χ inside each branch of S 1 ⊕ c S 2 . As the next example illustrates, this rule can be useful for simplifying the verification task, particularly when combined with Havoc and Consq.
Example 4. Suppose we want to prove:
where ϕ 1 is x 1 = −x 2 ∧ x 1 = 0 and ϕ 2 is y 1 + y 2 = 1. After applying the Expand and If rules (combined with elim and intro), we end up with the following two proof obligations:
Let's only focus on (1), since (2) is similar. Using first Comm and then If, we generate the following proof obligations:
Since the precondition of (1a) is unsatisfiable, we can immediately discharge it using Havoc and Consq. We can also discharge (1b) by computing its postcondition y 2 = 0 ∧ y 1 = 1, which can be obtained using
Step, -intro, elim, and Lift. Note that we could even verify this property using a pathinsensitive analysis (e.g., the polyhedra [11] or octagon [17] abstract domains) using the above proof strategy. In particular, conceptually embedding the second program inside the then and else branches of the first program greatly simplifies the proof. While we could also prove this simple property using self composition, the proof would require a path-sensitive analysis. S 1 , S 1 ) , . . . , (c n , S n , S n )] * χ as though χ was "embedded" inside each exit (break) point of L. In particular, this rule first reasons about the first k − 1 iterations of the loop (i.e., all except the last one) and then considers L k χ where L k represents the computation performed during the last iteration.
Let us now consider this rule in more detail. The first two lines of the premise state that I is an inductive invariant of the first k − 1 iterations of L, where k denotes the number of iterations of L. Hence, we know that I holds at the end of the k−1'th iteration. Now, we essentially perform a case analysis: When the loop terminates, one of the c i 's must be false, but we don't know which one, so we try to prove Ψ for each of the n possibilities. Specifically, suppose L terminated because c i was the first condition to evaluate to false during the k'th iteration. In this case, we need to symbolically execute S 1 , . . . , S i−1 before we can reason about S i χ. For this purpose, we define post i (I) as follows:
where post(φ, S) denotes a post-condition of S with respect to φ. Hence, post i (I) represents facts that hold right before executing (c i , S i , S i ). Now, if the loop terminates due to condition c i , we need to prove Ψ holds after executing which often arises when implementing a lexicographic order. Suppose we want to prove the following 3-safety property:
We can verify this Cartesian Hoare triple using our Loop rule and loop invariant ∀j.
. However, this invariant is not sufficient if we try to verify this code using self-composition.
Cartesian Loop Logic
The core calculus we have considered so far is sound and relatively complete, but it does not allow us to execute loops from different runs in lockstep. Since lockstep execution can greatly simplify the verification task (e.g., by requiring simpler invariants), we have augmented our calculus with additional rules for reasoning about loops. These proof rules, which we refer to as "Cartesian Loop Logic" are summarized in Figure 6 and explained next. Now, let's consider the last iteration of L. There are two possibilities: Either we broke out of the loop because c 1 evaluated to false or some other condition c i in R evaluated to false. In the former case, we can assume ¬c 1 and we need to execute S 1 . In the latter case, we can assume c 1 , and we still need to execute S 1 as well as the "part" of R that is executed in the last iteration, which is given by S . Hence, we can soundly reason about the last iteration of L using ( √ c 1 ;
Example 6. Consider again loop L from Example 5. Using Transform rules of Figure 6 , we have L S where S is: * as S and then proves the validity of Φ S χ Ψ . This proof rule is sound since {φ} S {ϕ} always implies the validity of {φ} [L]
* {ϕ} for any φ, ϕ whenever [L] * S. As we will see shortly, the Flatten rule can make proofs significantly easier, particularly when combined with the Fusion rules explained below. Fusion 1. This rule effectively allows us to perform lockstep execution for loops L 1 , . . . , L n that always execute the same number of times. Observe that this rule requires each L i to contain a single break point; hence, if this requirement is violated, we must first apply the Flatten rule.
Let us now consider this rule in more detail. Recall that S 1 . . . S n is the set of programs that are semantically equivalent to S 1 ; . . . , S n . Hence, the first two lines of the premise effectively state that I is an inductive invariant of:
Furthermore, the third line of the premise tells us that every c i will evaluate to false when L terminates, which, in turn, indicates that all L i 's always execute the same number of times. Thus, I ∧ ¬ i c i is a valid post-condition of L 1 . . . L n under precondition Φ.
Example 7. Consider loop L from Example 5, and suppose we want to verify the following Cartesian Hoare triple: Φ (r := 0; i := 0; L) Ψ where Φ is a 1 = b 2 ∧ b 1 = a 2 ∧ a 1 = b 1 and Ψ is r 1 < 0 ⇒ r 2 ≥ 0. After applying Seq, we generate the following proof obligation:
We then apply Flatten to both L 1 and L 2 , which yields the following proof obligation:
S 2 Ψ where L 1 , L 2 are α-renamed versions of the loop obtained in Example 6 and S 1 , S 2 are α-renamed versions of S from Example 6. We now apply Seq again, grouping together L 1 and L 2 , and then use Fusion to obtain a postcondition Φ :
Using the loop invariant Φ ∧ i 1 = i 2 and the Fusion and Consq rules, we can obtain the post-condition Φ = (Φ ∧ i 1 = i 2 ). This finally leaves us with the proof obligation Φ S 1 S 2 Ψ , which is easy to discharge using If and Havoc: Note that the post-condition can only be violated in the branches where r 1 and r 2 are both assigned to −1. However since r 1 := −1 and r 2 := −1 only execute when a 1 
. Hence, the original Cartesian Hoare triple is valid.
Observe that the Flatten and Fusion rules allow us to verify the desired property using the simple loop invariant i 1 = i 2 without requiring any quantified array invariants. Fusion 2. The Fusion 2 rule is similar to Fusion 1 and allows us to perform partial lockstep execution when we cannot prove that loops L 1 , . . . , L k execute the same number of times. Conceptually, this rule "executes" the loop bodies S 1 , . . . , S n in lockstep until one of the continuation conditions c i becomes false. Then, the rule proceeds with a case analysis: Assuming c i is the first condition to evaluate to false, we potentially still need to execute loops
. . , L n . Furthermore, when we execute these loops, we can assume the loop invariant I of the first loop as well as condition ¬c i (since we are assuming that c i is the first condition to evaluate to false). Hence, lines 3-5 in the premise verify the following proof obligation for each i:
Theorem 2 (Relative Completeness). Given an oracle for deciding the validity of any standard Hoare triple, if |= Φ S Ψ , then we also have Φ S Ψ .
The proofs of both theorems are provided in the extended version of the paper. return K-VERIFY(Φ , S χ , Ψ)
Step 15:
| S1 ⊕c S2; S χ : 16: let r := K-VERIFY(Φ ∧ c, S1; S χ , Ψ) in
17:
if(r != true) return false; If 18: return K-VERIFY(Φ ∧ ¬c, S2; S χ , Ψ ) 19 :
| (χ1 χ2) χ3:
21: 
Verification Algorithm Based on CHL
We now describe how to incorporate the CHL proof rules into a useful verification algorithm. At a high level, there are three important ideas: First, since the Havoc and Consequence rules can greatly simplify the verification task, our algorithm applies these rules at every opportunity. Second, we always prefer the If rule over other rules like Seq or Step, as this strategy avoids reasoning about parts of S n that contradict the desired precondition. Third, we try to maximize opportunities for lockstep execution of loops. For example, we use Associativity and Commutativity in a way that tries to maximize possible applications of the Fusion rules.
Our verification algorithm is presented in Figure 7 : K-VERIFY takes as input pre-and post-conditions Φ, Ψ, product term χ, and returns true iff we can prove Φ χ Ψ . As a first step, we check if Φ χ Ψ can be verified using only the Havoc and Consequence rules (lines 4-5).
Next, the algorithm performs pattern matching on χ in lines 6-21. In the base case, χ is a single program S, so we simply invoke a procedure VERIFY for proving the standard Hoare triple {Φ} S {Ψ} (line 7). The next case χ at line 8 is equally simple; in this case, we proceed by applying -elimination to verify Φ χ Ψ .
The next two cases concern terms χ that start with a loop. In particular, the pattern at line 9 checks if χ is of the form
, all programs start with a loop). In this case, we invoke the helper function K-VERIFYLOOP which chooses between the proof tactics from Figure 6 and which we consider in more detail later. On the other hand, if the first program starts with a loop (but not all the remaining ones), we then use Commutativity (line 12) with the hope let χi := REMOVEITH(χ, i) in
11:
if(!K-VERIFY(Φ , χi, Ψ)) return false; 
foreach (i ∈ [1,n]) 19 :
then return false; 22: return true; Figure 8 . Helper procedure for loops that we will eventually find matching loops in all programs (i.e., match line 9 in a future recursive call).
Continuing with line 13, we next pattern match on terms of the form A; S χ where the first program starts with an atom A. Since we can compute the strongest postcondition for atomic statements in an exact way, we apply the Step rule and generate a new proof obligation post(A, Φ) S χ Ψ where post(A, Φ) denotes the (strongest) postcondition of A with respect to Φ.
Next, consider the case where χ starts with a program whose first statement is S 1 ⊕ c S 2 . In this case, we apply the If rule rather than the Step rule, as this strategy has two advantages: First, as we saw in Example 4, this rule often simplifies the verification task. Second, since one of Φ ∧ c or Φ ∧ ¬c may be unsatisfiable, we might be able to easily discharge the new proof obligations in the recursive calls to K-VERIFY using the Consequence rule.
The next case at line 19 applies to product terms of the form S χ . Note that we only match this case if S consists of a single loop or conditional. Since we would like to apply the appropriate rules for conditionals and loops, we use intro and then make a recursive call -this strategy ensures that we will match one of the cases at lines 9, 11, or 15 in the next recursive call.
The final case at line 20 exploits associativity: If the first term of χ is not a single program, but rather another product term of the form χ 1 χ 2 , we apply associativity. This tactic guarantees that χ will eventually be of the form S χ in one of the future recursive calls.
Let us now turn our attention to the auxiliary procedure K-VERIFYLOOP shown in Figure 8 . The interface of this function is the same as that of K-VERIFY, but it is only invoked on terms of the form
e., all programs start with a loop). The goal of K-VERIFYLOOP is to determine which loop-related proof rule to use.
In the case analysis of lines 2-21, we first check whether all terms in χ start with loops of the form [c, S, ] * , and if so, we apply one of the Fusion rules from Figure 6 . Towards this goal, we invoke a function called FINDINV which returns a formula I with the following properties:
Continuing with lines 6-12, we next check whether it is legal to apply the simpler Fusion 1 rule or whether it is necessary to use the more general Fusion 2 rule. If it is the case that (I ∧ ¬ i c i ) ⇒ i ¬c i , all loops execute the same number of times, so we can apply Fusion 1.
Otherwise, we apply the more general Fusion 2 rule. In particular, the recursive calls at line 11 correspond to discharging the proof obligations in the premises of the Fusion 2 rule from Figure 6 . Here, the call to the auxiliary procedure to REMOVEITH returns the following formula:
Observe that we return true if and only if we can discharge all proof obligations for every i ∈ [1, n]. Now consider the final case at line 13 of the algorithm. In this case, we know that not all loops are of the form [c, S, ] * , so it may not be possible to apply the Fusion rules. Hence, we first apply the Transform rules from Figure 6 to rewrite the first loop in the form [(c, B, )] * If this rewrite is possible, we then apply the Flatten rule at line 15; otherwise, we resort to the Loop rule from Figure 5 . 3 Observe that recursive calls to K-VERIFY at line 20 correspond to the proof obligations in the premise of the Loop rule from Figure 5 .
Implementation
We implemented the verification algorithm from Section 5 in a tool called DESCARTES, written in Haskell. DESCARTES uses the Haskell language-java package to parse Java source code and the Z3 SMT solver [12] for determining satisfiability. Our implementation models object fields with uninterpreted functions and uses axioms for library methods implemented by the Java SDK.
The main verification procedure in DESCARTES receives a Cartesian Hoare triple that is composed of a method in the IR format, the arity of the specification, and the pre-and post-conditions. It then generates k alpha-renamed methods and applies the K-VERIFY algorithm from Section 5. If the specification is not respected, DESCARTES outputs the Z3 model that can used to construct a counterexample.
As a design choice, our loop invariant generator (i.e., the implementation of FINDINV) is decoupled from the main verification method since we aim to experiment with several loop invariant generation techniques in the future. Currently, our implementation of FINDINV follows standard guess-and check methodology [14, 20] :
1. A guess procedure guesses a candidate invariant I. Currently, we generate candidate invariants by instantiating a set of built-in templates with program variables and constants which include (i) equalities and inequalities between pairs of variables and (ii) quantified invariants of the form ∀j.
where • indicates an unknown expression to be instantiated with variables and constants.
2. A check procedure verifies if candidate invariant I is inductive. This is performed by discharging two verification conditions (VCs):
• The pre-condition implies I;
• The cartesian hoare triple given by Eq (2) in Section 6 is valid. The validity of this cartesian hoare triple is checked by a recursive call to K-VERIFY.
Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate our approach, we used DESCARTES to verify user-defined relational operators in Java programs, including compare, compareTo, and equals. We believe this application domain is a good testbed for our approach for multiple reasons: First, as mentioned in Section 3, these relational operators must obey multiple k-safety properties, allowing us to consider five different k-safety properties in our evaluation. Second, since comparators and equals methods are ubiquitous in Java, we can test our approach on a variety of different applications. Third, comparators are notoriously tricky to get right; in fact, web forums like Stackoverflow abound with questions from programmers who are trying to debug their comparator implementations. The goal of our experimental evaluation is to explore the following questions: (1) Is DESCARTES able to successfully uncover k-safety property violations in buggy programs? (2) Is DESCARTES practical? (i.e., how long does verification take, and how many false positives does it report?) (3) How does DESCARTES compare with competing approaches such as self-composition [1] and product construction [3, 5] ?
To answer these three questions, we performed three sets of experiments. Java projects from Github. In our third experiment, we compare DESCARTES with the self-composition and product construction approaches and report our findings. In what follows, we describe these experiments in more detail.
Buggy Examples from Stackoverflow
We manually curated a set of 34 comparator examples from on-line forums such as Stackoverflow. In many online discussions that we looked at, a developer posts a buggy comparator -often with quite tricky program logic-and asks other forum users for help with fixing his/her code. Hence, we were often able to extract a buggy comparator together with its repaired version from each Stackoverflow post. Given this collection of benchmarks containing both buggy and correct programs, we used DESCARTES to check whether each comparator obeys properties P1-P3 required by the Java Comparator and Comparable interfaces.
The results of our evaluation are presented in Figure 9 , and the benchmarks are provided under supplemental materials. For a buggy comparator called COMPARE, the benchmark labeled COMPARE † describes its repaired version. For the column labeled V , indicates that DESCARTES was able to verify the property, and means that DESCARTES reported a violation of the property. For a few benchmarks, (e.g., CATBPOS), the post did not contain the correct version of the comparator and the problem did not seem to have a simple fix; hence, Figure 9 does not include the repaired versions of a few benchmarks.
From Figure 9 , we see that DESCARTES automatically verifies all correct comparators and does not report any false alarms. Furthermore, for each buggy program, DESCARTES pinpoints the violated property and provides a counterexample. Finally, the running times of the tool are quite reasonable: On average, DESCARTES takes 1.21 seconds per benchmark to analyze all relevant k-safety properties.
Relational Operators from Github Projects
In our second experiment, we evaluated our approach on equals, compare, and compareTo methods assembled from top-ranked Java projects on Github, such as Apache Storm, libGDX, Android and Netty. Towards this goal, we wrote a script to collect relational operators satisfying certain complexity criteria, such as containing loops or at least 20 lines of code and 4 conditionals. Our script also filters out comparators containing features that are currently not supported by our tool (e.g., bitwise operators, reflection).
In total, we ran DESCARTES over 2000 LOC from 62 relational operators collected from real-world Java applications (provided under supplemental materials). Specifically, our benchmarks contain 28 comparators and 34 equals methods. In terms of running time, DESCARTES takes an average of 9.14 seconds to analyze all relevant k-safety properties of the relational operator. Furthermore, the maximum verification time across all benchmarks is 55.27 seconds. Among the analyzed methods, DESCARTES was able to automatically verify all properties in 52 of the 62 benchmarks. Upon manual inspection of the remaining 10 relational operators, we discovered that DESCARTES reported 5 false positives, owing to weak loop invariants. However, the five remaining methods turned out to be indeed buggy -they violate at least one of the three required k-safety properties. In summary, DESCARTES was able to verify complex realworld Java relational operators with a very low false positive rate of 8%. Furthermore, DESCARTES was able to uncover five real bugs in widely-used and well-tested Java projects. We believe this experiment demonstrates that reasoning about k-safety properties is difficult for programmers and that tools like DESCARTES can help programmers uncover non-trivial logical errors in their code.
Comparison with Self-Composition and Product
In our last experiment, we compare DESCARTES with two competing approaches, namely the self-composition [1] and product construction [3, 5] methods, which are the only existing techniques for verifying k-safety properties. Recall that both of these approaches explicitly construct a new program that is subsequently fed to an off-the-shelf verifier.
To compare our technique with these approaches, we use the non-buggy benchmarks considered in Sections 7.1 and 7.2.
Self-composition. Given Cartesian Hoare triple Φ S Ψ of arity k, we emulate the self-composition approach by generating k-alpha-renamed copies of S and then verifying the standard Hoare triple {Φ}S 1 ; . . . ; S k {Ψ}. However, for the benchmarks from Sections 7.1 and 7.2, this strategy fails to verify more than half (52%) of the examples. Furthermore, for the examples where self composition is able to prove the relevant k-safety properties, it is ∼ 20× slower compared to DESCARTES. We believe this result demonstrates that selfcomposition is not a viable strategy for verifying k-safety properties in many programs.
Product programs. As mentioned earlier, another strategy for verifying k-safety is to explicitly construct a so-called product program and use an off-the-shelf verifier. Unfortunately, there is no existing tool for product construction in Java, and there are several possible heuristics one can use for constructing the product program. Furthermore, previous work on sound product construction [3] only considers loops of the form while(C) do S, making it difficult to apply this technique to our benchmarks, almost all of which contain break or return statements inside loops. 4 Hence, even though a completely reliable comparison with the product construction approach is not feasible, we tried to emulate this approach by considering two different strategies for product construction:
• S1: We eliminated break statements in loops in the standard way by introducing additional boolean variables.
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• S2: We eliminated break statements in loops by using our Transform rules from Figure 6 .
In both strategies, our product construction tries to maximize the use of the Fusion rules from Figure 6 , since this rule appears to be critical for successful verification.
Product construction with S1. In terms of the overall outcome, this product construction strategy yielded results very similar to self-composition. In particular, we were only able to verify half of the benchmarks (50.7% to be exact), and analysis time was a lot longer (143 seconds/benchmark for product construction vs. 8 seconds for DESCARTES). While it may be possible to decrease the false positive rate of this approach using a more sophisticated invariant generator, this result demonstrates that our approach is effective even when used with a relatively simple invariant generation technique.
Product construction with S2. When using strategy S2 together with the Fusion rules of Figure 6 , we were able to prove 85% of the correct benchmarks, but verification became significantly slower. In particular, DESCARTES is, on average, ∼ 21× faster compared to the explicit product construction approach, and, in several cases, three orders of magnitude faster. However, since the Transform rule is a contribution of this paper, it is entirely unclear whether previous product construction approaches can verify the 71 correct benchmarks we consider here.
Related Work
The term 2-safety property was originally introduced by Terauchi and Aiken [23] . They define a 2-safety property to be "a property which can be refuted by observing two finite traces" and show that non-interference [16, 19] is a 2-safety property. Clarkson and Schneider generalize this notion to k-safety hyperproperties and specify such properties using second-order formulas over traces [10] . However, they do not consider the problem of automatically verifying k-safety.
Self-composition. Barthe et al. propose a method called self-composition for verifying secure information flow [1] . In essence, this method reduces 2-safety to standard safety by sequentially composing two alpha-renamed copies of the same program. Self-composition is, in theory, also applicable for verifying k-safety since we can create k alpha-renamed copies of the program and use an off-the-shelf verifier. While theoretically complete, self-composition does not work well in practice (see Section 7 and [23] ).
Product programs. Our work is most closely related to a line of work on product programs, which have been used in the context of translation validation [18] , proving noninterference [3, 5] and program optimizations [21] . Given two programs A, B (with disjoint variables), these approaches explicitly construct a new program, called the product of A and B, that is semantically equivalent to A; B but is somehow easier to verify. While there are several different techniques for creating product programs, the key idea is to execute A and B in lockstep whenever possible, with the goal of making verification easier. Unlike these approaches, we do not explicitly create a full product program that is subsequently fed to an off-the-shelf verifier. In contrast, our approach combines semantic reasoning with the construction of Hoare triples that are relevant for verifying the desired k-safety property.
Relational program logics. Our work is also closely related to a line of work on relational program logics [6, 25] . Benton originally proposed Relational Hoare Logic (RHL) for verifying program transformations performed by optimizing compilers [6] . While Benton's RHL provides a general framework for relational correctness proofs, it can only be used when two programs always follow the same control-flow path, which is not the case for different executions of the same program. Several extensions of Benton's RHL have been devised by Barthe et al. to verify security properties of probabilistic systems, where the closest to our work is pRHL [2] . While pRHL is a relational logic specialized for probabilistic systems, our core CHL calculus is a generalization of pRHL for proving general k-safety properties for k > 2, modulo the rules dedicated to probabilistic reasoning. Specifically, CHL allows the exploration of any arbitrary interleaving of k programs and does not require any form of structural similarity between programs. It is unclear how to use prior work on relational program logics for proving k-safety properties for k > 2.
Another key difference of this work from previous techniques is the focus on automation. Specifically, unlike prior work that uses relational hoare logics, our verification procedure is fully automated and does not rely on interactive theorem provers to discharge proof obligations. Another common limitation of previous relational logics (e.g., RHL and pRHL) is that they do not yield satisfactory algorithmic solutions for reasoning about asynchronous loops that execute different numbers of times. In contrast, we propose a specialized calculus to reason about both synchronous and asynchronous loops and show that our approach can be successfully automated. Furthermore, our approach can reason about loops that contain multiple exit points, whereas previous work only considers loops of the form while(C) do S.
Bug finding. In this work, we focused on verifying the absence of k-safety property violations. While our technique is sound, it may have false positives. A complementary research direction is to develop automated bug finding techniques for finding violations of k-safety properties. One possible approach for automated bug detection is to construct a harness program using self-composition and then use off-theshelf bug detection tools, such as dynamic symbolic exection [8, 15] or bounded model checking [7, 9] . Based on our experience with the CATG tool [22] for dynamic symbolic execution, this naive approach based on self-composition does not seem to scale for examples that contain input-dependent loops. For example, we were not able to successfully use dynamic symbolic execution to detect the bug in the comparator from Figure 1 since CATG times-out. We believe a promising direction for future research could be to explore complementary bug finding techniques for detecting violations of k-safety properties.
Conclusion
We have proposed Cartesian Hoare Logic (CHL) for proving k-safety properties and presented a verification algorithm that fully automates reasoning in CHL. Our approach can handle arbitrary values of k, does not require different runs to follow similar paths, and combines the verification task with the exploration of k simultaneous executions. Most importantly, our approach supports full automation and does not require the use of interactive theorem provers. Our evaluation shows that DESCARTES is practical and gives good results when verifying five different k-safety properties of relational operators in Java programs. Our comparison also demonstrates the advantages of DESCARTES over selfcomposition and explicit product construction approaches, both in terms of precision as well as running time.
